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Analytical Framework for Retirement
Policy Decisions
Constance F. Citro and Eric A. Hanushek

It is commonly recognized that the process of policy development and

implementation is not closely linked to research and analytical efforts.
This situation became very clear during recent policy debates on health
care. As task forces, executive branch agencies, and Congress strove to
define new organizational and regulatory policies to improve provision
of health services, they repeatedly found that knowledge about key underlying relationships was missing. The dearth of relevant information
was most apparent when analysts attempted to price out reforms and
arrived at conclusions that differed by integer multiples. In some key
ways, however, the situation with respect to health care policy is better
than the situation with respect to retirement income policy. The heterogeneity of circumstances and the long delays between policy and effects
place special analytical requirements on modeling retirement income
policy. Moreover, the analytical infrastructure for many policies actively
being considered today is noticeably weak.
In recognition of this situation, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor requested that the National Research Council form a Panel on Retirement Income Modeling.!
This panel of experts was charged with recommending how the government could be better positioned to make decisions concerning various
elements of retirement policy,2 and here we describe the issues taken up
by the Panel. The Appendix lists some of the specific recommendations
issued by the Panel.

Background Perspective
This effort is not aimed at designing public policies. Instead, its objective
is to ensure that appropriate analytical tools are available when policies
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are being designed. The development of appropriate tools, however, is
complicated by the difficulty of the problem.
Retirement income for any individual results from a series oflifetime
decisions and an array of current and past governmental policies. Some
of these decisions appear quite remote from anything to do with retirement, even though they have strong implications for ultimate retirement
income and well-being of the individual. For example, the private pension income of an individual is directly linked to occupational and firm
employment choices made throughout the lifetime, even though the immediate circumstances of income and job satisfaction may loom much
larger in these career choices. Government tax regulations may similarly
affect the path of savings accumulation of individuals, having significant
effects on the security provided by private savings.
The lengthy time periods involved in savings and retirement and decisions present special modeling challenges. Actions taken today will not
have their full effects for many years to come; similarly, the need for various policies may not be apparent today because the problem will not be
felt until some time in the future. Understanding savings and retirement
decisions that unfold over the work life of individuals necessitates either
extensive longitudinal data sets that follow individuals across careers
and/or strong assumptions about how today's outcomes might relate to
those in the future.
In many areas of research, we attempt to infer what will develop over
time for one group by comparing this group today to an older group
today. For example, if we are interested in life-eycle earnings of people
with different amounts of education, we frequently take data from a
cross-section of individuals and implicitly assume that todays 25-year-old
twenty years from now will look like today's 45-year-old. Recently, however, data have become available both for repeated cross sections (e.g.,
the Current Population Survey) and for true panels that follow a set of
individuals over time (e.g., the Panel Study on Income Dynamics or the
National Longitudinal Surveys). Analyses of these suggest that observations and inferences about the future earnings of 25-year-olds differ
significantly from those that would result from simple cross-sectional
projections. At the very least, the economic environment and the relative demands for individuals with varying amounts of schooling have
changed dramatically over the past two decades, and, while there are still
debates about the correct interpretation of how earnings patterns have
changed, there is no disagreement that the simple cross-sectional analysis is prone to very distorted pictures. The availability of rich longitudinal
data has taken us along the road of being able to separate the natural
life-eycle changes from effects of different time periods and from being
in different age cohorts (even though analytical difficulties still remain).
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With savings and retirement decisions, the same basic analytical difficulties are present and are, if anything, stronger. Analysis of individual
decisions in these areas must sort out life-cycle changes from other effects that occur over time. But layered on top is the much more central
role of governmental policies that are in place at any point in time and
that might be expected to change over time. A similar statement holds
for the policies of firms and organizations providing private pensions.
Thus, the active and continuing decisions of individuals are conditioned
by expectations about firm and governmental decisions, making the evolution of decisions much more complicated. Moreover, because of the
undeniable importance of the evolving policy environment, the data and
modeling requirements become much more central-or, put the other
way, assumptions required to convert simple cross-sectional analyses into
statements about future outcomes are much more tenuous.
A related issue is the interaction of individual and institutional decisions. If we take the traditional view that retirement income results from
a combination of Social Security support, individual pension incomes,
and private savings, it is immediately apparent that interactions among
the various components are likely to be very important. Decisions that
materially affect the expected pattern of Social Security payments almost
certainly will have an impact on how individuals prepare for retirement
through their own savings behavior. They may also influence the patterns of firm-provided pension plans. Thus, even though individual components of the retirement income package might usefully be separated
for some purposes, understanding the full implications for retirement
income security of policy initiatives is unlikely to be possible without
careful consideration of the interactions across areas.
Many of the most important implications for the consideration of retirement income policy flow from distributional considerations. Specifically, the heterogeneity of circumstances-related to past employment
decisions, individual savings behavior, health considerations, and luckimplies that retirement situations vary widely. Moreover, some of the
worst off in terms of retiremen t incomes are just those who are least selfsufficient or least able to deal with unfortunate circumstances. Because
these people typically are a focal point of public policy concerns, it is
important to understand the distribution of possible retirement outcomes and how public policies \vill affect this distribution. Obtaining information about distributional outcomes adds yet a further complexity
to modeling efforts. Many approaches to understanding behavioral outcomes are better suited to describing average behavior than to identifying the distributional impacts. This, again, is further complicated by the
presence of important programmatic and behavioral interactions across
areas.
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The difficulties of modeling and projecting the impacts ofvarious policies itself introduces another element. The complexity suggests that
there will remain considerable uncertainty about the ramifications of
any given policy. Read backwards, the development of sound policies
would be aided by an understanding of the magnitude of any uncertainty
in the analysis. Importantly, because projections and uncertainty may
vary significantly across different policies proposals, estimation of the
underlying uncertainty involved would allow proposals to be compared
in natural ways.
The provision of information about uncertainty is, however, seldom
done in any policy setting. There are natural reasons for this. First,
many models used to assess possible effects of policy are very complex,
making conventional calculation of uncertainty, confidence intervals,
and the like very difficult. Second, projections of the impacts of policies
can seldom be compared with what actually happened, because the policies that are simulated are seldom actually put into place. In other
words, in developing a set of policies, a wide range of alternatives is frequently discussed and evaluated, but the ultimate policy might not even
be among those that were evaluated. Third, as discussed previously, the
projections of outcomes far into the future makes assessment of accuracy
difficult or impractical if it is necessary to wait for the full evolution of
outcomes. Fourth, there has never been very strong desire by policymakers to have information about uncertainty in policy analyses. Indeed,
they frequently make known their explicit preferences for point estimates of any outcomes. Nonetheless, a sensitivity to uncertainty in analyses would seem valuable if not essential, but providing such information
requires different approaches than commonly available now.

Some Immediate Conclusions
Within this background and following the preliminary analysis of the
Panel on Retirement Income Modeling, some conclusions begin to
emerge. While details on how to design a research and modeling program to prepare best for future policy decisions are unclear at this time,
some basic foundations emerge.

Current Lack of Integrated Models
Current retirement modeling is marked by special-purpose models
which focus on very specific factors or issues. Perhaps the broadest
model in regular use is the Social Security model(s) that provide projec-
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tions of the status of the Social Security system. This cell-based approach
to understanding the evolution of Social Security income is the primary
tool for evaluating proposed changes in the Social Security system, such
as those flowing from the current imbalances in the trust fund. While
powerful from the narrow viewpoint of the Social Security system, this
model does not provide for consideration of other components of retirement income and their interactions, does not provide distributional information about retirement incomes, and does not assess the underlying
analytical uncertainty involved. (Additionally, as discussed below, the
model itself is not available for use or assessment by outside researchers
and users.)
While there have been past attempts to integrate the various components of retirement income in microsimulation efforts, these proprietary
models have not been maintained or evaluated in recent years. The most
significant of these (DYNASIM2 and PRISM) do not provide a current
basis for analyzing policy issues and would require considerable modification and updating to be useful. Some other scattered efforts to model
retirement incomes are available, but few would believe that these are
ready to be used in active policy debates.
Almost any effort to provide policy analysis and advice will require
some way to integrate the effects of policies across different components
of retirement income (and across the underlying behavioral decisions).
This is not to say that all modeling efforts will have to be the "grand
model" that considers all facets, but it is to say that there must be mechanisms for understanding the feedbacks within and across areas of policy
changes.

Data Shortcomings
Matched data that combines administrative information with other descriptions of individuals have been particularly important in modeling
retirement incomes and behavior. During the 1970s, important efforts
were made to obtain exact matches of individual Social Security histories
with Current Population Survey data. These databases, remarkably, provide the most up-to-date historical information that is publicly available.
(A subsequent exact match by Social Security has not been available for
public use.) Such matches of administrative records and of basic survey
data provide an extraordinarily important source of information upon
which to build models of retirement income.
Concerns about confidentiality of data frequently enter these discussions, as they rightfully should. On the other hand, a variety of statistical,
legal, and organizational approaches are available to protect the confi-
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dentiality of individuals. None of the concerns, if dealt with in an appropriate manner, appears sufficient to overcome the importance and
usefulness of creating new matched data sets that incorporate the wealth
of historical data available from administrative records.
Panel data on individuals over time have also proved to be an essential
element of modeling efforts for behavior that evolves over the life cycle.
In recent years, researchers and analysts have discovered the power of
panel data for distinguishing the effects of individual differences from
more fundamental behavioral responses. Further, the insights gained
from observing how individuals respond to different stimuli and circumstances are often clearer and less complicated than efforts not based on
actual data about specific individuals. Panel data are considerably more
expensive because the same people must be followed and coaxed into
repeated responses, but there is a growing appreciation for the fact that
panel data are sufficiently superior to more extensive data available only
as a single cross section to warrant such spending.
The importance of obtaining panel data is built into recent efforts
such as the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS effort is designed as an ongoing panel with data collections already fielded in 1992
and 1994. Nonetheless, because of the expense of panels and because
many budgetary decisions are made myopically, there is constant pressure to let large panel data efforts lapse. Doing so in the area of retirement decisions would be very shortsighted.
Finally, because an important component of retirement income comes
from firm-based pension plans, any general modeling effort must consider the interaction of individuals and firms. Yet few data that match
individuals with firms are currently available. Such data as exist generally
are very limited in information about firms (if based on household surveys) or on individuals (if based on firm surveys). The need for better
data matching individuals and firms has been long recognized, but concerns about expense and about confidentiality have prevented such developments. For understanding the full character of retirement plans
and prospects, more attention to such data seems essential. Further, in
line with the previous point, panel data offer exceptional analytical promise, even though such data are almost never available for firms.

Organizational Issues
A series of organizational issues also seems important to questions of developing adequate policy models. At the top of the list comes a concern
about the fractionated nature of policy concerns and policy modeling.
Within the federal government many different organizations and agen-
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cies, each with its own mission, enter into policy decisions. The Social
Security Administration is perhaps largest and most noticeable, but the
Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services,
and the Department of the Treasury have important programs and policies that influence the income and security of retired persons. From
initial investigation, it would appear that each of the separate agencies
involved in retirement income policies tends to stick quite closely to its
mission and not to allow its policy analysis and modeling to stray far off
into other areas. This would be sensible if policies could be segregated
and well-insulated from other institutions-a situation that does not appear to hold.
Fundamentally, it appears critical that any design of sensible retiremen t income policies comes from the joint efforts of the affected agencies. A corollary is that developing useful policy models should involve
the active interaction (and support) of the various agencies. As with
many collective action problems, achieving good results will almost certainly involve some organizational changes, such as cross-agency commissions or the more active involvement of the Office of Management
and Budget. Without taking a position on the specific institutional structure, it is clear that some institutional structure is needed.
Another aspect of the organization of modeling efforts relates directly
to the construction of integrated models. In the past, private contractors
have developed some of the most complete models related to retirement incomes (DYNASIM2 and PRISM). These very large microsimulation models were a result of the available technology. They attempted to
manipulate data and simulate complicated family behavior at the level
of the individual household. As such, they were constructed to operate
on mainframe computers. The pattern of funding and support also dictated that, while complicated, little documentation was available. As a
result, they have always been black boxes that have not been subjected
to close scrutiny and validation efforts by people other than their designers. A similar story holds for the models of individual government agencies. For example, the details of the one or more models supporting
Social Security Administration projections are unknown to outside researchers and analysts.
Given the current changes in technology, which make most computational efforts a relatively small portion of total costs, it is natural to expect (and demand) that future developments proceed in much different
ways. Specifically, modeling efforts, capitalizing on current computer
technologies, should be much more transparent and portable. The idea
behind this is quite simple: scrutiny by the scientific community is likely
to improve the reliability and acceptance of policy models. Further,
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there is little argument for government creation of analytical monopolies in situations where the government is a primary funder of development and where the results of the modeling efforts could have important
ramifications for the formulation of public policies.
The implementation of such an idea is complicated. It rests not only
on how models are developed but also on issues of documentation, portability across computer platforms, ease of use, and the like. Nevertheless, the general principle is clear, even though not a central part of any
past decisions.
'
A final organizational issue relates to the interaction between the research community and the policy community. The design of databases
and of policy models is a complicated issue fraught with possibilities for
serious mistakes. Because we do not currendy have an existing structure
to build on in developing integrated policy models of retirement income, the best way to proceed is uncertain. One implication, since both
initial and continuing design decisions can have very long-term effects,
is that regular mechanisms for getting both the broad policy community
and the broad researcher community to evaluate plans and progress
should be instituted. An ongoing and broadly based advisory panel is an
obvious approach.

Conclusions

.

"

The conclusions are simple. First, we appear to be a long way from having an adequate base for making informed decisions about retirement
income policy. Part of this is very explicable. The problems are particularly difficult, and solutions will demand the joint efforts of different
agencies and researchers when an appropriate institutional structure is
currently lacking. Nevertheless, almost any general consideration of future policy debates would place various aspects of retirement income
high on the agenda. The issue is simply whether or not we make these
decisions based on a good understanding of the likely ramifications of
any policies. Second, much of any more complete policy modeling effort
will require more extensive data than are currenlly available. Because
there are long lead times in developing good databases, efforts should
be directed at these issues immediately (and currently existing efforts
such as the Health and Retirement Snldy (HRS) and the Study of the
Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) efforts should
receive continued support). Third, the organization of the research and
development effort will undoubtedly have a strong influence on the results. The current approach of highly comparnnentalized efforts seems
inefficient and possibly very limiting.
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Appendix
The translation of the various considerations in to operating principles
for government agencies is easiest to see through the recommendations
in the Panel's interim report (National Research Council, 1995).

Openness in Governmental Model Development
Much of prior policy modeling sponsored by the government and conducted by various agencies has not been widely available to outside users
and analysts. While there are some circumstances which might justify
closed modeling, in general it leads to inferior policy analysis. The models escape scrutiny of other analysts and cannot be subject to the same
verification process.
Recommendation 1. Retirement-income-related policy models that are
operated by government agencies or that are developed with government funds should be made publicly available to the policy and research
communities in a timely manner.
Recommendation 2. Retirement-income-related policy models should be
adequately documented so that analysts other than the model developers can readily use them.
Recommendation 3. Government agencies should take advantage of
the dramatic changes in computing technology and the dramatic reductions in computing costs to develop (or support the development of)
retirement-income-related policy models that are fully accessible to the
research community

Ensuring Availability of High Quality Data
One lesson of many policy initiatives of the past has been that having
relevant data at the time of discussion is extremely important. Analysis
can seldom overcome the limitations of incomplete or erroneous data.
At the same time, data collection efforts must begin well before any
analytical uses are contemplated. There must also be a commitment to
continuing the data collection efforts, particularly given the greatly enhanced value of having panel data.
Recommendation 4. Relevant agencies should continue to support existing retirement-income-related panel surveys of individuals. Such surveys, which permit analyzing behavioral responses to policy changes over
time, are essential for retirement-income-related research that can inform the development of adequate policy models. They must be con tin-
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ued if they are to provide sufficient longitudinal information for analysis
purposes.
Recommendation 5. Relevant agencies should develop and implement
data collection systems that provide improved information on the nature
and extent of employer retirement-income-related benefits and on employer and worker behavior relevant to retirement. The new data should
include panel studies of employers and samples of their employees. Researchers and policy analysts who will use these data should be involved
from the outset in the design of the data systems.
Recommendation 6. Relevant statistical and administrative agencies
should create up-to-date matched files of survey responses and administrative records that, with suitable protections to maintain the
confidentiality of individuals or employers, are available for retirementincome-related research and policy analysis use.

Organization of Modeling and Research
The difficulties of mounting a coherent research effort with decentralized agencies and without good mechanisms for agency/academic cooperation are especially noteworthy. While coordinating devices have
the chance of introducing extra regulation and bureaucracy, some balance seemS ryecessary.
Recommendation 7. Relevant agencies should explore ways to integrate
retirement-income-related research, data collection, and policy modeling, so as to obtain the most cost-effective use of available resources. Such
integration should represent a high priority goal in order to minimize
duplication of effort, ensure that important issues are not overlooked,
and ensure that priorities are set in light of the full range of policy
concerns.
Recommendation 8. Relevant agencies should explore mechanisms for
bringing academic researchers and government analysts together on a
regular, routine basis to facilitate the development of high quality,
relevant models and associated data for addressing retirement-incomerelated policy concerns.
.
Notes
1. Financial support for this panel was also provided by the National Institute
on Aging and by TIAA-CREF. See National Academy of Sciences (1995).
2. The Panel members were Henry Aaron (Brookings Institution), Alan J.
Auerbach (University of California, Berkeley), Christopher Bone (Actuarial Sciences Association), Peter Diamond (MIT), Eric A. Hanushek (University of
Rochester), Michael Hurd (SUNY, Stony Brook), Olivia S. Mitchell (University
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of Pennsylvania), Samuel H. Preston (University of Pennsylvania), John P. Rust
(University of Wisconsin, Madison), Timothy M. Smeeding (Syracuse University),
andJames P. Smith (Rand Corporation).
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